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China’s ascent in global trade governance: from rule 
taker to rule shaker and maybe rule maker?
Henry Gao
Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 
2001, one of the most intriguing questions for trade analysts has been how 
the ‘new kid on the block’ would behave once it became a formal Member 
of the multilateral trading system. The question is twofold. First, will 
China faithfully implement its WTO accession commitments? Second, 
will China seek to upset the existing power structure in the WTO?
Of the two issues, the first has received the most attention. In addition 
to abundant media coverage, official statements and academic commen-
taries, the concern is well illustrated by the following passages from the 
Working Party Report of China’s WTO Accession (WTO 2001a: para. 9):
Some members of the Working Party indicated that because of the sig-
nificant size, rapid growth and transitional nature of the Chinese econ-
omy, a pragmatic approach should be taken in determining China’s need 
for recourse to transitional periods and other special provisions in the 
WTO Agreement available to developing country WTO Members. Each 
agreement and China’s situation should be carefully considered and 
specifically addressed. In this regard it was stressed that this pragmatic 
approach would be tailored to fit the specific cases of China’s accession 
in a few areas, which were reflected in the relevant provisions set forth 
in China’s Draft Protocol and Working Party Report. Noting the pre-
ceding statements, Members reiterated that all commitments taken by 
China in her accession process were solely those of China and would preju-
dice neither existing rights and obligations of Members under the WTO 
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Agreement nor on-going and future WTO negotiations and any other pro-
cess of accession …
(Emphasis, in italics, added)
As a precaution against potential problems post-accession, the acces-
sion package includes many special rules tailor-made for China. These 
include substantive obligations such as the grant of national treatment 
to foreign persons and firms, as well as foreign products (while the nor-
mal WTO national treatment obligation applies to products only) (WTO 
2001b: section 3). It also includes the commitment to treat subsidies pro-
vided to state-owned enterprises as specific subsidies (which otherwise 
would not be deemed illegal under the normal WTO rules on subsidies) 
(WTO 2001b: section 10.2). There are also procedural obligations, such 
as the establishment of a Transitional Review Mechanism for China in 
addition to the normal Trade Policy Review cycle for WTO Members 
(WTO 2001b: section 18), and the requirement to translate all foreign 
trade laws and regulations into one of the official languages of the WTO 
beyond the normal WTO transparency requirement (WTO 2001a: para. 
334).
Moreover, concerns that China might fall short of its WTO obligations 
have been shared not only among WTO Memberships as a whole but have 
been a particular concern for the most powerful player in the WTO: the 
United States. For example, in the US–China Relations Act of 2000, which 
was enacted by the US government to grant China Permanent Normal 
Trade Relationship (PNTR) ahead of China’s accession to the WTO, the 
US noted the following:1
The record of the People’s Republic of China in implementing trade-
 related commitments has been mixed. While the People’s Republic of 
China has generally met the requirements of the 1992 market access 
memorandum of understanding and the 1992 and 1995 agreements on 
intellectual property rights protection, other measures remain in place 
or have been put into place which tend to diminish the benefit to United 
States businesses, farmers, and workers from the People’s Republic of 
China’s implementation of those earlier commitments.2
In light of these concerns, the US government established a complex mech-
anism under the same Act to monitor ‘compliance by China with its com-
mitments under the WTO’ involving the Departments of Commerce, 
1 US–China Relations Act of 2000.
2 Ibid, para. 6901 (10).
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China’s ascent in global trade governance 155
State and Agriculture, as well as the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR).3
In the view of the author, however, the second issue, while relatively 
neglected, is more important. At the end of the day, the first issue is 
only about the market access commitments made by a particular WTO 
Member. No matter how important the underlying commercial inter-
ests or the market of the Member might be, the implementation of such 
commitments is still unlikely to have a major impact on the institutional 
foundations of the multilateral trading system as a whole. In contrast, if 
China were to take an uncooperative approach in the WTO, this could 
well affect the smooth functioning or even viability of the multilateral 
trading system. Will China, a long-time outsider to the international 
system, be a ‘good citizen’ in the WTO, an institution that has evolved 
from a club-like group into an organization with great diversity and vast 
differences among its Members? Here again, the opinions are divided. 
In the lead-up to China’s accession, some commentators believed that 
China could weaken both the WTO dispute settlement system4 and 
the  decision-making process,5 while others countered that, judging by 
China’s relatively uneventful track record in the United Nations (UN) 
and other international organizations that it has participated in, China’s 
entry to the WTO would not be so disruptive to the status quo (Abbott 
1998; Feinerman 1995; Lardy 1996, 1999, 2002).
As China enters its tenth year of WTO Membership, has the dragon 
brought a ‘reign of fire’ to the multilateral trading system and rocked 
its institutional foundations? This chapter will answer this question by 
reviewing China’s participation in two key activities of the WTO – i.e. 
trade negotiations and dispute settlement – as well as another import-
ant component of global trade governance: regional trade agreements 
(RTAs). I will argue that, overall, China has evolved from a passive ‘taker’ 
of the existing rules to a country that will ‘shake’ the rules for its own 
interests or even ‘make’ new rules. At the same time, the pace of China’s 
ascent has been uneven in different areas. The most aggressive strategy 
3 Ibid, paras. 6943 and 6951.
4 For views that China’s accession will overburden the WTO dispute settlement system, see 
Ostry (1998: 9, 2003: 263).
5 For views that China’s accession will weaken the effectiveness of the WTO decision-
 making mechanism, see e.g. Steinberg (1999). According to Steinberg, the unique political-
economic system of China and the sheer size of its economy will cause ‘political frictions’ 
in the WTO upon its accession. However, due to its ineffective consensus decision- making 
process, it is unlikely that the WTO will be able to adopt new rules to deal with such prob-
lems. This will in turn further weaken the WTO decision-making mechanism.
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Henry Gao156
has been apparent in RTA negotiations, where China has been on a frantic 
shopping spree since its accession to the WTO. Similarly, while China was 
initially reluctant to use the multilateral dispute settlement system, it has 
become a major player since 2007. In terms of multilateral trade negoti-
ations, China has sent mixed signals: while it has made many submissions 
on negotiating issues in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, China 
has so far successfully resisted calls from the United States (USA) and the 
European Union (EU) for it to play a leading role in the long-stalled trade 
talks. After exploring the reasons for varying behavioural patterns in a 
range of areas, this chapter concludes by exploring China’s future role in 
the WTO, as well as the potential ramifications of China’s ascent in global 
trade governance.
1 Multilateral trade negotiations
As the world’s third-largest economy (in terms of nominal GDP) and 
trader (World Bank 2010c; WTO 2009a), China has considerable eco-
nomic clout. The growing economic muscle of China has been gradually 
translated into elevated standings in key international institutions. While 
China has been a permanent Member of the UN Security Council ever 
since it resumed its UN Membership in 1971, it only recently gained 
more voting rights in both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank (BBC 2006; World Bank 2010a, 2010b; Xinhuanet 2010). 
However, the transition seems yet to happen at the WTO, where many key 
players keep complaining about China’s alleged ‘back-seat’ role. Indeed, 
as recently as early 2008, both the USA and the EU were still reportedly 
frustrated over China’s passive approach to the Doha Round of negoti-
ations and the WTO’s management more broadly (Otteman 2008). Even 
senior Chinese officials openly acknowledge this. For example, in late 
2006, Dr Zhang Xiangchen, then Director-General of the Department of 
WTO Affairs of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China (MOFCOM) and the current Deputy Permanent Representative of 
China’s WTO Mission, conceded in an interview that China is only play-
ing a ‘preliminary constructive role’.6
6 See Beijing Youth Daily, Shangwubu Shimao Zuzhi Si Sizhang Tan Rushi: Cheng 
Shimao Tixi Yifenzi (Director-General of Department of WTO Affairs on China’s WTO 
Accession: Becoming Part of the WTO System). Available at http://finance.people.com.
cn/GB/70392/5146335.html [accessed in November 2010].
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China’s ascent in global trade governance 157
While China has indeed taken a low-profile approach, this does not 
necessarily mean that China has made no contribution to the Doha 
Round. In fact, judging from the number of negotiating proposals sub-
mitted since the launch of the Round, China is one of the most active 
WTO Members in the negotiations. According to a study based on the 
official records of the WTO in 2003, China made a total of twenty-nine 
written submissions to the Trade Negotiations Committee and its sub-
sidiary bodies, the Ministerial Conference at Doha, and the working 
groups on the four Singapore issues. On this measure, China is the most 
active developing country participant and the fourth most active among 
all WTO Members in the Doha Round (Nordström 2002: 28–30). As of 
July 2008, China has submitted more than one hundred proposals in the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) (Zhang 2008). These proposals are 
quite comprehensive and cover virtually all issues in the DDA, ranging 
from agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) to rules 
and services.
Given such active participation in the actual negotiation process, why 
then did China choose to take a low profile in public? In the author’s view, 
the reasons include the following, elaborated in the forthcoming text.
1.1 The ‘Recently Acceded Member’ argument
Having been under the spotlight for fifteen years in one of the long-
est accession negotiations7 in the history of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO, the first explanation for China’s low 
profile in public in the DDA is that the Chinese government wanted 
some quiet breathing space to digest and implement its heavy accession 
commitments. Indeed, China’s concessions on both trade in goods and 
services greatly exceeded those of other WTO Members, most of which 
have not changed since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. As argued 
by Shi Miaomiao, Deputy Director-General of the Department of WTO 
Affairs of MOFCOM (M. Shi 2005: 28–9):
In terms of industrial products, if applying the Uruguay Round modality 
for tariff-reduction, China would only be required to reduce its tariff from 
a base point of 42.7% to the final bound tariff of 32.4% in year 2004, with 
an average reduction by 24.1%. According to its accession commitments, 
7 China’s dubious honour of being the WTO Member with the longest accession process 
has been overtaken by Russia, which is in its seventeenth year of accession negotiation as 
of 2010.
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however, China’s tariff reduction level is much greater. In 2004, China’s 
average tariff rate on industrial products was reduced to 9.5%. After 
China’s fulfillment of its commitments on accession into WTO, it has 
reduced its tariff rate by as much as 78.9%, which is much bigger than 
the 33% tariff reduction commitment made by other countries during the 
Uruguay Round. Moreover, even if the new round of Doha negotiation 
concludes with a reduction rate of as much as 68.5%, the total tariff cut of 
China would still exceed the total tariff cut of other countries during the 
Uruguay Round and Doha Round combined.
…
In terms of agriculture products, if applying the Uruguay Round 
modality for tariff-reduction, China would only be required to reduce its 
tariff from the base point of 54% to a final bound tariff of 37.9%. Instead, 
during its WTO Accession negotiations, China made greater concessions 
on reduction of agricultural tariffs. Pursuant to China’s commitments, 
the agricultural tariff fell in 2002 to 18.5%, in 2004 to 15.6%, and by the 
year 2008 it will be further reduced to 15.1%. Such reductions would 
amount to an overall tariff reduction rate by 67.1%, which far exceeds the 
concession made by other members (36% for the developed Members, and 
24% for the developing Members). Even if the new Doha Round concludes 
with a reduction rate on agricultural products of as high as 48%, the total 
tariff cut of China would still exceed the total tariff cut of other countries 
during the Uruguay and Doha Round combined.
Independent experts affirm this view. For example, Mattoo notes 
that China’s services commitments are generally higher than other 
WTO Members in terms of both the width of coverage and the depth 
of market-opening. Indeed, he praises China’s commitments under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as ‘the most radical ser-
vices reform program negotiated in the WTO’ (Mattoo 2003: 300). This 
observation is shared by Lardy, who noted in his study of China’s acces-
sion package that the country’s commitments ‘far surpass those made 
by founding members of the WTO and, in some cases, go beyond those 
made by countries that have joined the organization since its founding in 
1995’ (Lardy 2002: 104–5).
Because of its substantial accession commitments, China has been 
arguing that it, along with other ‘Recently Acceded Members’ (RAMs), 
should not be required to make the same level of concessions as the found-
ing WTO Members (WTO 2003).
To be fair, many WTO Members were initially sympathetic to the call for 
special treatment for RAMs. For this reason, the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration explicitly states that ‘[w]e recognize the special situation of 
recently-acceded Members who have undertaken extensive market access 
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China’s ascent in global trade governance 159
commitments at the time of accession. This situation will be taken into 
account in the negotiations’ (WTO 2005: para. 58). Indeed, had the DDA 
been concluded according to the original schedule, it is not unlikely that 
China could have avoided making substantial concessions on agriculture 
or NAMA by hiding under the ‘RAM’ label. Unfortunately, however, as 
the Doha Round drags on, fewer Members are willing to give a ‘free ride’ 
to Members such as China that acceded a decade ago.
Moreover, the USA and the EU face increasing pressures: on the one 
hand, their negotiating partners ask them to make more concessions; on 
the other hand, vocal domestic constituencies (such as labour and farm-
ers’ groups) have been calling for the government to seek more inroads 
into foreign markets while avoiding having to provide access to their own 
domestic markets. Thus, they need to find another scapegoat to divert part 
of the attention. What could be a better target than China – the economic 
superpower on rapid rise? Thus, since 2006, the USA and the EU have 
been pushing China from both sides. For example, the USA has repeat-
edly urged China, as the biggest beneficiary of the multilateral trading sys-
tem, to take more responsibilities at the WTO (Schwab 2006). Similarly, 
the EU has argued that China should be required to make contributions 
just like other WTO Members (Khor 2007). While the USA and EU use 
ambiguous terms such as ‘leadership’ to describe such ‘responsibilities’ 
and ‘contributions’, a careful reading between the lines of their messages 
reveals that what the USA and the EU really have in mind is asking China 
to provide more concessions in key areas such as agriculture, NAMA and 
services so that they can have a better report card to show to their domes-
tic stakeholders.
While China fought hard to avoid making new concessions by being 
recognized as a RAM, it seems that it has lost the battle. According to 
the latest negotiating drafts, the prevailing consensus seems to be that 
flexibility will be extended mostly to small, low-income RAMs and ‘very 
recently acceded Members’, i.e. those that acceded to the WTO after the 
Doha Round was launched.
1.2 Lack of expertise
Even if China wishes to participate more fully in the WTO, as a new 
Member China lacks familiarity with the rules of the game and cannot 
participate effectively. This is the case for both substantive WTO rules as 
well as for procedural rules.
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Regarding substantive rules, while the most important of them have 
been compiled in the Secretariat publication, The Legal Texts: The Results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (WTO 1999), 
there are also numerous GATT protocols, decisions and other legal instru-
ments that are not available in a readily accessible format (WTO 1994: 
Article 1(a)–(c)). Moreover, as noted by the Appellate Body in Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II, there are many panel reports adopted during the 
GATT era, which, as ‘an important part of the GATT acquis … create 
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be 
taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute’ (WTO 1996: 18). 
In addition, in line with the tradition of ‘constructive ambiguity’, many 
WTO rules are drafted in such a way that they are difficult to interpret 
for any Member, let alone newer ones. This is especially the case for rules 
that provide for flexibilities, which are often too technical for developing 
countries to master, as Deere demonstrated in her excellent study on the 
use of flexibilities in the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Right (TRIPS) agreement (Deere 2009). For new Members in particular, it 
is a major challenge to grasp these legal rules.
Compared with substantive rules, the procedural rules of the WTO are 
even more difficult for new Members to decipher. While Articles 9 and 10 
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO Agreement) 
provide a set of elaborate rules for voting requirements for various deci-
sions, formal voting has been rare in the history of the GATT and WTO.8 
In practice, most if not all decisions are made by ‘consensus’. What is 
‘consensus’ then? According to the footnote to Article 9.1 of the WTO 
Agreement, consensus is defined as the situation where ‘no Member, pre-
sent at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the 
proposed decision’. However, such cryptic explanation offers little help 
to the uninitiated. Ironically, that is probably the reason why the con-
sensus rule is preferred over the clearly defined and easily understood 
rules, such as two-thirds or three-quarters majority. To make it even 
more hopeless, even the consensus rule itself is of little use in reality as 
it applies to decision-making in formal meetings, which unfortunately is 
not where most decisions are made at the WTO. As acknowledged by the 
WTO Secretariat, ‘[i]mportant breakthroughs are rarely made in formal 
meetings of [WTO] bodies, least of all in the higher level councils. Since 
decisions are made by consensus, without voting, informal consultations 
8 For a review of the problems with the GATT/WTO decision-making rules, see Ehlermann 
and Ehring (2005).
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China’s ascent in global trade governance 161
within the WTO play a vital role in bringing a vastly diverse membership 
round to an agreement’.9 Thus, the only way to acquire essential negotiat-
ing skills such as agenda-setting and coalition-building is through actual 
participation in the real work of the WTO. Unfortunately, as China did 
not join the WTO as a formal Member until six years after the WTO was 
formed, it faced a rather steep learning curve.
In this regard, the thirty years of experience China had already acquired 
as a Member of the UN at the time it joined the WTO were not of much 
help either, for two reasons. First, the nature of trade negotiations is very 
different from the political grandstanding at the UN. As one WTO offi-
cial observed: ‘The UN is a talk-shop; the WTO is for getting real business 
done.’10 Second, at the UN, China has been a Member of its key decision-
making body – the Security Council – from the very beginning. In con-
trast, there is no such formal institutional arrangement at the WTO. Also, 
the key players in the global trade arena have been rather reluctant to 
grant China a seat at the table of the informal negotiating groupings for 
fear of diluting their own power.11 While China has substantial trade vol-
ume, this by itself has not guaranteed China a position as a key player in 
WTO negotiations.
Given the substantial obstacles China has faced since its accession to 
the WTO, its performance in trade negotiations to date has been quite 
satisfactory. While no indicator can accurately quantify a country’s nego-
tiating prowess, the number of submissions made in the negotiations can 
serve as a useful proxy (Nordström 2002: 12). China did not make any 
submission in the Doha Round until 20 June 2002, when it made a pro-
posal on fisheries subsidies.12 By February 2005, China made more than 
ten submissions (G. Shi 2005: 21). The number jumped to sixty-seven by 
December 2007. By the time of the July 2008 meeting, China had made 
more than one hundred submissions concerning the Doha Round. 
  9 WTO. Understanding The WTO: The Organization, Whose WTO is it Anyway? Avail-
able at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm#top [accessed in 
November 2010].
10 The author’s interview with a senior WTO diplomat.
11 As I will note below, due to China’s unique position as both a developing country and a 
major trader, neither the developed countries nor the major developing countries regard 
China as one of their own and both view China more as a threat rather than a potential 
ally.
12 Ministry of Commerce of China, ‘Zhongguo Canyu Duoha Huihe Tanpan Dashiji (Major 
Milestones in China’s Participation in Doha Round Negotiations’. Available at http://
cwto.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200910/20091006574682.html?1126026260=872534836 
[accessed in November 2010].
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Judging from the rapidly increasing number of submissions, China has 
been learning very fast.
1.3 The mismatch between the China-specific provisions  
and the normal WTO framework
In addition to the extensive market access commitments in both goods 
and services, China also reluctantly accepted many discriminatory 
clauses that are tailor-made for itself as part of its accession agreement. 
By their nature, these China-specific provisions are beyond the normal 
WTO framework. Thus, even if China acquired expertise in normal WTO 
negotiations, this would not solve the main problems facing China.
These provisions can be further divided into two categories: WTO-
plus obligations, i.e. obligations that are beyond those normally required 
of WTO Members; and WTO-minus rights, i.e. rights that are less than 
those usually enjoyed by WTO Members.
The WTO-plus obligations include, for example:13
The obligation to translate all foreign trade laws into one of the official •	
languages of the WTO, while the normal transparency obligation in 
the WTO agreements only requires Members to publish trade laws and 
regulations in their own national languages (GATT Article X).
A special transitional review mechanism. Under this mechanism, China •	
shall be reviewed annually by the WTO since its accession. There will be 
a total of nine such reviews, with the first to the eighth of such reviews 
conducted every year after 2001 and a final review no later than the tenth 
anniversary after China’s accession. This obligation is in addition to the 
normal periodic review as mandated by the Agreement on Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM), under which China would only need to be 
reviewed once every four years at the time of its accession.14
The obligation to provide national treatment to both foreign products •	
and persons, while the WTO national treatment clauses only cover 
measures applicable to products.
13 For a detailed discussion of the WTO-plus obligations, see Qin 2003.
14 Section C of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Annex 3 to the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization. Available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
legal_e.htm#annex3 [accessed in November 2010]. The frequency of review is deter-
mined according to the trade share of the Member under review. At the time of its acces-
sion, China was the sixth-largest trader in the world. With its growing trade share, China 
is now reviewed on a biennial basis.
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As to the WTO-minus rights, they include the following:15
Designation of China as a ‘non-market economy’ in anti-dumping •	
investigations for the first fifteen years after its accession, which makes 
it easier for investigating authorities to find the existence of dumping.
The inclusion of an ‘alternative benchmark’ methodology in subsidy •	
and countervailing measures (SCM) investigations, which also creates 
biases in favour of a positive finding on subsidies, all else being equal.
A special textile safeguard mechanism (until the end of 2008), and a •	
transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism (until the end of 
2013). Both safeguard mechanisms considerably lowered the substan-
tive and procedural safeguards in GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards 
Agreement, making it much easier for other countries to invoke safe-
guard measures against China while at the same time making it more 
difficult for China to challenge such measures.
As these provisions were specifically designed to soften the impact 
of China’s WTO accession on other Members, they have a much more 
direct impact on Chinese exports than WTO rules applicable to other 
Members, at least during the transitional period. While the exact rela-
tionship between China’s special provisions and the normal WTO rules is 
still subject to debate,16 most commentators would agree that the China-
specific provisions would take precedence pursuant to the principle of 
lex specialis derogat legi generali (a special rule prevails over a general 
rule). Thus, at least until 2017 – i.e. before the expiration of these China-
specific provisions – China would regard the revision of these special 
provisions as a task more urgent than the revision of the general WTO 
rules. Unfortunately, revising the China-specific accession provisions 
through the WTO negotiations will be extremely hard, if not impossible. 
To start with, the WTO is ill-equipped for this task. Among the WTO 
Agreements, none contain explicit rules on how to revise the accession 
protocol. In practice, other than a few isolated cases of minor revisions of 
accession commitments,17 there has been no precedent of comprehensive 
15 For a detailed discussion of the WTO-minus rights, see Gao 2007a.
16 For the legal problems raised by these provisions, see Gao 2007a: 56–7.
17 For example, when Mongolia acceded to the WTO in 1997, it committed to phase out and 
eliminate its export duty on raw cashmere within ten years. Due to both economic and 
environmental concerns, however, Mongolia found itself unable to eliminate the export 
duty. It requested the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) for a five-year waiver on its acces-
sion commitment on cashmere, which was approved by the CTG on 9 July 2007. Available 
at www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/good_counc_9july07_e.htm [accessed in 
November 2010]. The background of this case can be found in Tsogtbaatar 2005.
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revisions of accession terms for particular countries. Thus, if China were 
to insist on revising its accession provisions, the default consensus rule 
would probably apply. As we have seen from the history of the WTO, con-
sensus among all WTO Members is extremely hard to come by; indeed, it 
is one of the reasons why the Doha Round is taking so long. More import-
antly, most other WTO Members are not interested in the idea of revising 
China’s terms of accessions. Furthermore, even if assuming, arguendo, 
that China could somehow persuade other Members to accept its request 
to revise its accession commitments, it probably will have to provide com-
pensation to other Members as per the current rules on the renegotiation 
and modification of schedules.18 Such compensation will have to take the 
form of additional concessions to other Members beyond the commit-
ments China made upon accession. However, as I explained earlier, it is 
very unlikely that China will be willing to provide such additional con-
cessions. As will be elaborated below, this factor also partly explains why 
China chose to take a relatively high profile in WTO disputes and RTA 
negotiations.
Against this context, the recent calls by the USA and the EU for China 
to shoulder more responsibility and make more concessions in the Doha 
Round are rather ironic. On the one hand, the USA and the EU imposed 
harsh conditions on China in the accession negotiations and effectively 
denied China the normal Membership status.19 Yet, on the other hand, the 
USA and the EU now want China to behave like a ‘normal’ WTO Member, 
or even to go beyond what normal WTO Members would offer by tak-
ing up ‘leadership responsibility’. Until the USA and the EU abandon 
such double standards and instead treat China on a non-discriminatory 
basis, why should China be expected to contribute to the Round above 
and beyond what is expected of a normal Member? Indeed, as eloquently 
explained by Sun Zhenyu, China’s Ambassador to the WTO, China has 
made more contributions to the Round than even major developed coun-
tries. According to Sun’s statement at the Informal Trade Negotiations 
Committee Meeting held on 11 August 2008, which is a kind of post-
 mortem session after the failure of the Members to reach major break-
through during the previous week:
18 See e.g. GATT Article 28 and GATS Article 21.
19 As noted by Cattaneo and Braga (2009) in their comprehensive study on WTO accessions, 
while many other WTO Members that acceded to the WTO recently were also asked to 
assume obligations beyond the normal WTO disciplines, none of them are as onerous as 
those imposed on China, which remain a ‘particularly challenging and atypical case’.
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We have tried very hard to contribute to the success of the Round. It is a 
little bit surprising that at this time the US started this finger pointing. 
I am surprised because they are now talking about cotton, sugar, rice of 
China as seems that we are not going to make any efforts in the Round. 
Let me explain what China has contributed in the round.
Because of our accession negotiations, our tariff in agriculture on aver-
age is 15.2% and now bound at this level, which is lower than the aver-
age of European Union, lower than Canada, lower than Japan, lower 
than quite a number of other developed countries on average. But on that 
basis, we are committed in this round to cut further down our tariffs, the 
applied tariffs deeply. And in NAMA, our average is 9%, bound at that 
level. And in this round, we will cut about 30% in applied level. So we are 
making contributions of 50% of the total developing countries in terms 
of applied rate cut.
…
If you consider what the contributions that developed countries are 
going to make, in OTDS (Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic Support) 
the US is spending $7 to 8 billion this year or last year, maybe a little bit 
more to 10 billion, but they are offering $14.5 billion with a lot of policy 
space for themselves. And in their tariff cut in agriculture, they are pro-
tecting their sensitivities through sensitive products while they are say-
ing ‘well even if we have sensitive products for 5 or 4% of our tariff lines, 
we will have TRQ (Tariff Rate Quota) expansions’. But they can never 
expand their TRQ to the level of China’s TRQ quantities. In our case, our 
TRQ is 9 million tons for wheat, 7 million tons for corn, 5 million tons 
for rice. How about your quota, even after the expansion they will never 
pass half a million tons. Where is the new market access to the developed 
countries?
(Sun 2008)
1.4 Awkward position on other issues
Among the diversity of WTO Members, China is notable for not only the 
size of its economy but also its multifaceted interests. This in turn results 
in different or even conflicting demands in the formulation of its trade 
policy. Here are two examples of such conflicts.
The first is the conflict between China’s self-designated political pos-
ition as a developing country and its economic standing as a major 
trader. For political reasons, China has always labelled itself as a develop-
ing country and joined several major developing country groups in the 
WTO, such as the G20.20 On the other hand, however, the fact remains 
20 The G20 is a coalition of developing countries pressing for ambitious reforms of agri-
culture in developed countries with some flexibility for developing countries (not to be 
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that China is one of the most important traders in the world along with 
major developed countries such as the USA, the EU and Japan. Thus, on 
many issues, China’s true interests actually lie closer to those of devel-
oped countries rather than those of developing countries. Take agricul-
ture, for example. One of the major demands of developing countries is 
the elimination of export subsidies and reduction of domestic support. 
However, as one of the largest importers of many agricultural commod-
ities, such as wheat, cotton and soya beans, China would probably find 
itself becoming the primary victim of the hike in world commodity 
prices that would accompany the end of subsidies by developed coun-
tries. Also, in the area of NAMA, major developed countries have been 
pressing developing countries to reduce tariffs. As the ‘factory of the 
world’, China stands to gain tremendously from the reduction of indus-
trial tariffs. However, China finds it politically difficult to request that 
developing countries lower their tariffs on industrial goods. Another 
example is trade facilitation. While many developing countries argued 
against inclusion of this issue in the Doha negotiating agenda – particu-
larly early in the Round – China’s position as one of the top exporters 
in the world gives it a strong incentive to push for the inclusion of trade 
facilitation in the WTO framework, thereby making the customs pro-
cess more efficient and cheaper. On all of these issues, due to the diffe-
rence between China’s political position and economic interests, it would 
be politically awkward for China to openly deviate from the developing 
country ‘party line’. Thus, the best strategy seems to be to keep a low 
profile.
The second conflict is in the area of the WTO’s rules related to trade 
remedies, where China is both the biggest victim and a major user. Take 
anti-dumping measures, for example. China has been the favourite target 
of anti-dumping investigations and actions for many years. According to 
a study by Bown, from 1995 to 2008 China was subject to 295 new anti-
dumping measures, which was double that against Korea – the second 
most frequent anti-dumping target (Bown 2009: 82). Bearing in mind 
that Bown’s figure for China only starts from its WTO accession while the 
numbers for other countries date back to 1995, the contrast is even more 
confused with the G20 group of finance ministers and central bank governors, and its 
recent summit meetings). It currently has twenty-three Members: Argentina, Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
agric_e/negoti_groups_e.htm [accessed in November 2010].
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stark. Thus, one would think that China has reason to push for stricter dis-
ciplines on the use of anti-dumping in the Doha Round negotiations. At 
the same time, however, as one of the major users of anti-dumping actions 
in recent years, it also seems to make sense for China to argue that more 
discretion be given to the investigating authorities. Two other factors fur-
ther complicate the picture. First, as noted by Messerlin, China is targeted 
more by developing countries than developed countries, especially if the 
number of anti-dumping actions is adjusted for trade size. For example, 
let’s say that the EU imposes one anti-dumping measure against a certain 
dollar amount of imports from China. According to Messerlin’s study, 
India will adopt ten anti-dumping measures while Mexico will adopt 
sixty such measures (Messerlin 2004: 32). However, for fears of endanger-
ing the solidarity among developing countries and undermining the sup-
port of China by other developing countries on key political issues such as 
the Taiwan problem, at least in the eyes of the Chinese leadership, it would 
not be a good idea for China to openly confront developing countries.
Second, because China is not treated as a market economy in anti-
dumping investigations, it does not matter much if the general rules 
under the Anti-dumping Agreement are improved or not, unless, of 
course, China argues for the clarification of the rules on the treatment 
of non-market economies. Acquiring clarification on the latter would 
be a difficult task for two reasons. First, as very few countries are in the 
non-market economy club, most WTO Members would not be sympa-
thetic to China’s request. Second, even if the relevant rules in the main 
Anti-dumping Agreement were revised, it is unclear whether or not 
China would ultimately benefit from this as the China-specific ‘non-
market economy’ provision is regulated by the Accession Protocol, 
which, legally speaking, is an entirely different agreement to anti-
dumping.
As the discussions above have illustrated, China’s decision to keep a 
low profile in the current Round actually makes great sense. Unless there 
are substantial changes in the factors discussed above, it is unlikely that 
China will voluntarily assume a leading role in the talks.
2 Multilateral dispute settlement
In contrast to its reticence in WTO negotiations, China has transformed 
itself from being a reluctant player into an aggressive litigant in WTO 
dispute settlement activities. Its roles have shifted through three stages, 
outlined below.
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2.1 Rule taker
From the time of its accession, China has taken a cautious approach 
towards WTO litigation. As a newcomer unfamiliar with WTO legal 
rules, China put more emphasis on learning them than on winning spe-
cific disputes. In an effort to discourage litigation, China usually settled 
disputes quickly with the complainant once a case was filed or threatened, 
even if it might have had strong arguments to defend its actions.21 For 
example, in a matter concerning value-added tax rebates on integrated 
circuits, the USA made a request for consultations in March 2004, and 
the dispute was settled just four months later. The same period also saw 
China cave in only two months after the EU threatened to bring a for-
mal WTO complaint against China’s export quota regime on coke, an 
essential raw material for the production of steel. The climax of this 
approach was reached in the Kraft Linerboard case, in which the United 
States complained of inconsistencies with the Anti-dumping Agreement 
when MOFCOM imposed anti-dumping duties on US Kraft Linerboard 
imports in September 2005. On Friday, 6 January 2006, the USA finally 
threatened with a formal WTO complaint. On the next working day – i.e. 
Monday, 9 January 2006 – the Chinese government made an announce-
ment to scrap the anti-dumping duties in this case.
2.2 Rule shaker22
To build a better understanding of the dispute settlement process, China 
actively participated as a third party in real WTO cases during the first 
few years after its accession. From August 2003 to 2006, for example, 
China joined almost every panel established during the period as a third 
party. Through its participation as a third party, China gained invalu-
able understanding of the WTO dispute settlement system and boosted 
its confidence in participating in the system as a main player. Such 
enhanced confidence was well illustrated by the remarks of Minister 
Bo Xilai of MOFCOM in May 2005. When asked whether China would 
bring complaints in the WTO against the countries that imposed restric-
tions against textile exports, Minister Bo Xilai responded (Xinhuanet 
2005):
21 For a review of China’s approach towards WTO dispute settlement in this period, see Gao 
2005.
22 For a review of China’s shift in strategy, see Gao 2007b.
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First, China has the right to resort to WTO dispute settlement mechan-
ism. We should not hesitate to use this right when needed. Second, while 
bilateral consultation has its own benefits, if each side sticks to its own 
view, the problem won’t be solved as there is no neutral arbiter. Thus, in 
addition to one-to-one consultations, sometimes it’s more effective to 
have the disputes reviewed in the multilateral setting. Third, the restric-
tions against Chinese products are inconsistent with WTO rules and dis-
criminatory. We strongly oppose such measures. Of course, it’s up to us to 
decide whether to take any legal action against such measures and when 
to do so.
Some of the thinking that informed China’s more aggressive new strat-
egy in WTO litigation is revealed in the following analysis of Mexico’s 
litigation strategy in the Soft Drinks case (WTO 2006) by Dr Ji Wenhua, 
an official in charge of dispute settlement activities at China’s WTO 
Mission in Geneva. In the article he published in the July 2006 issue of 
the China WTO Tribune, a monthly journal on trade policy published by 
MOFCOM and edited by Dr Zhang Xiangchen – then Director-General 
of the Treaty and Law Department of MOFCOM – Ji noted that Mexico 
fought an uphill battle in the case brought against it by the USA, but made 
a good effort defending its case. According to Ji:
In this case, Mexico’s legal position was rather weak, but it has made an 
unrelenting effort by raising many arguments which are tenuous at best 
and fighting a losing battle.
While we should not publicly praise such litigation strategy and atti-
tude, this case still offers us some worthy lessons: under certain circum-
stances, we should try to employ some strategies, including resorting to 
sophistry and delay tactics.
As a respondent, we should try to come up with as many factual and 
legal arguments as possible. Even if such arguments are mere sophistry, 
or made for purposes such as creating artificial difficulties for the panel, 
gaining sympathies, diverting the attention of other parties, or delaying 
the progress of the case, they are justified so long as they serve to protect 
our own interest.
(Original emphasis. Original in Chinese. Translated by the author.)
Equipped with this enlightened new attitude towards the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, China has taken a markedly different approach 
since then. The turning point came in March 2006, when the USA, EU 
and Canada brought a joint complaint against China in the Auto Parts 
case (WTO 2009e). The complainants accused China of violating WTO 
obligations by treating some imported automobile parts as whole-car 
imports and imposing additional charges equivalent to the difference 
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between the higher tariff for whole-car imports and the lower tariff applic-
able to automobile parts. Technically speaking, this is a rather simple case 
as the illegality of the Chinese measure seems to be quite obvious, espe-
cially as China has made specific commitments to impose no more than 
a 10 per cent tariff on automobile parts imports in its accession package. 
However, rather than continuing the old practice of settling the disputes 
privately, China decided not to concede defeat without a good fight. Over 
the next two and a half years, the case went all the way from the Panel to 
the Appellate Body until the Appellate Body finally issued its report in 
December 2008.
The same aggressive approach was taken in several other cases, espe-
cially the TRIPS case (WTO 2009d) and the Publications and Audiovisual 
Products case (WTO 2010b). In both these instances, China tried to shake 
or even bend the existing rules by aggressively making legal arguments that 
put its position in a better light. This strategy was reflected not only in the 
extensive substantive legal arguments China made, but also in its sophis-
ticated use of procedural objections. As all good lawyers know, while pro-
cedural matters may seem mundane, they are of no less importance than 
substantive claims; if used well, they can even save a hopeless case. Judging 
from its performance in these cases, China has mastered the ‘sophistries’ 
very well. In the TRIPS case, for example, China attacked the complain-
ants on such procedural grounds as the admissibility of certain evidence 
(WTO 2009d: paras. 6.14–6.37) and the correct scope of the measures at 
issue (WTO 2009d: paras. 7.1–7.19). Similarly, in the Publications case, 
China’s procedural arguments included the failure of the USA to estab-
lish a prima facie case (WTO 2010b: paras. 7.458–7.460), the evidentiary 
standards (WTO 2010b: paras. 7.620–7.632) and the appropriate scope of 
the Panel’s terms of reference (WTO 2010b: para. 7.63).
2.3 Rule maker
As observed above, while China accepted some rather harsh terms as the 
price for its WTO accession, it will likely be difficult for China to change 
them through the multilateral negotiation process. This has left the coun-
try with only one option: trying to challenge the terms and soften their 
negative impacts through creative interpretation in WTO dispute settle-
ment proceedings.
Among the five cases filed by China since September 2008, four (US – 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (WTO 2008a); EU – Steel 
Fasteners (WTO 2009b); US – Tyres (WTO 2009c); and EU – Footwear 
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(WTO 2010a)) were aimed at changing the rules, especially the provisions 
in China’s Accession Protocol. For example, in the United States – Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties case, China challenged the decision 
by the US authorities to impose both anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties against several products imported from China. In addition to the 
usual claims under the GATT, the Anti-dumping (AD) Agreement, and 
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreements, two 
claims made by China are particularly interesting. These are described in 
more detail below.
The first claim is that the United States violated China’s Accession 
Protocol by failing to follow the proper methodology for determining the 
existence and amount of subsidy benefits. Under Section 15(b) of China’s 
Accession Protocol, in subsidy investigations, other WTO Members could 
‘use methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit, which 
take into account the possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in 
China may not always be available as appropriate benchmarks’. Similar to 
subparagraph (a) of the same Section, which allows other WTO Members 
to use surrogate prices in anti-dumping investigations against Chinese 
firms, this provision was introduced to address the concern that prices in 
China do not reflect the true cost as China is not yet a full market economy. 
However, unlike the non-market economy (NME) status in anti-dumping 
investigations, which is scheduled to expire fifteen years after China’s acces-
sion, the alternative benchmark methodology does not have an expiration 
date. Thus, theoretically speaking, the alternative benchmark method-
ology could be invoked even one hundred years after China’s accession to 
the WTO. As discussed above, it would have been very hard for China to 
change this provision in its accession terms through negotiations in the 
WTO. Instead, China decided to limit the applicability of the provision by 
giving teeth to some seemingly innocuous terms in the provision. First, the 
USA failed to make a finding that there were ‘special difficulties’ in applying 
the prevailing terms and conditions in China as the basis for the determin-
ation of the existence of benefits. Second, the USA failed to notify the SCM 
Committee of the methodologies it used. This is a very clever way to reduce 
the utility of the provision. It remains to be seen how the Panel would rule 
in this case as it has not issued its report at the time of the completion of this 
chapter. However, if the Panel chooses to give a strict interpretation of the 
term ‘special difficulties’, this might greatly reduce the attractiveness of the 
provision and even effectively render it void.
The second claim is that the United States violated the relevant provi-
sions in the Anti-dumping and Safeguards Agreements through its dual 
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application of both anti-dumping and countervailing duties against the 
same products. The WTO rules on this matter as they currently stand 
are unclear. While it is possible for the same product to be subject to 
both anti-dumping and SCM investigations at the same time, under 
GATT Article VI.5, WTO Members are prohibited from the application 
of both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to the same identical 
products in the same case, but non-market economies do not receive the 
same treatment and may be subject to both anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duties. However, this provision also states that the prohibition 
of dual application only applies to cases of export subsidies and does 
not include actionable domestic subsidies; thus it is not applicable to the 
alleged subsidies to Chinese products. On the other hand, one may also 
argue that to the extent that the dual application leads to overcompensa-
tion, this might result in inconsistencies with the ‘lesser duty rule’ under 
both the Anti-dumping and SCM Agreements. In summary, therefore, 
China hopes to clarify or even make new rules through this case. As the 
expiration date for non-market economy status in anti-dumping inves-
tigations draws closer, subsidy investigations will become the main issue 
facing Chinese firms. Hopefully, through the clarification of these terms 
in dispute settlement activities, China will be able to change the rules in 
its favour so that its firms will have an easier time when this issue arises.
Similarly, both the tyres safeguard case against the United States and 
the two anti-dumping cases against the EU involve claims of violation of 
the individual clauses authorizing the respective trade remedy measures 
in China’s Accession Protocol. Given that the Panel and Appellate Body 
have not been particularly fond of trade remedy measures, there is a good 
chance that the ambiguous terms used in the Accession Protocol will be 
interpreted in a way that would restrict the utility of these provisions in 
the future. Should this be the case, China would have effectively changed 
the rules through the WTO dispute settlement process.
3 Regional trade agreements
Strictly speaking, RTAs exist in their own universe parallel to the multi-
lateral trading system. However, as they cover increasingly more glo-
bal trade,23 they have become an important component to global trade 
23 For example, according to Carpenter, more than half of world trade is conducted under 
the preferential tariff regimes under RTAs rather than the most favoured nation (MFN) 
regime under the WTO. See Carpenter (2009: 25).
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governance. Moreover, for most WTO Members, the WTO and RTAs are 
two alternative tracks that they will pursue at different times. Thus, in 
order to have a complete picture of China’s position in global trade gov-
ernance, I will also briefly discuss China’s RTA approach here.
While China is now an active player in WTO dispute settlement, it 
still took more than five years for it to initially ‘warm up’. In contrast, 
China did not waste any time in negotiating RTAs. Starting with the 
2002 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between China and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China has been busy negotiat-
ing RTAs covering both trade in goods and services. The subsequent 
years witnessed the signing of two Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangements with Hong Kong, China24 (June 2003) and Macau, 
China25 (October 2003), respectively; the FTAs with Chile26 (November 
2005), Pakistan (November 2006), New Zealand (April 2008), Singapore 
(October 2008), Peru (April 2009), Costa Rica (April 2010); the launch 
of FTA negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council27 (April 2005), 
Australia28 (May 2005), Iceland29 (April 2008) and Norway30 (September 
2008); and with negotiations soon to begin with the South African 
Customs Union (SACU).31
While political considerations seem to override economic benefits 
in many of these RTAs, China has also been trying to make new rules 
through them.32 These rule-making efforts cover both the structural 
aspects and the substantive rules of RTAs.
24 The full text of the Arrangement is available at www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext/
cepa_legaltext.html [accessed in November 2010].
25 The full text of the Arrangement is available at www.http://bo.io.gov.mo/edicoes/en/
dse/cepa/ [accessed in November 2010].
26 The full text of the Agreement is available at: www.direcon.cl/documentos/China2/tlc_
chile_china_ing_junio_2006.pdf [accessed in November 2010].
27 See ‘China Completed First Round of FTA Negotiations with Six Gulf States’. Available 
at http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/af/ak/200505/20050500088391.html [accessed in 
November 2010].
28 Australia–China FTA Negotiations, Subscriber Update, 26 May 2005. Available at: www.
dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/050526_subscriber_update.html [accessed in November 
2010].
29 See http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/iceland/200809/49_1.html [accessed in November 
2010].
30 See http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/ article/southafrica/200809/48_1.html [accessed in 
November 2010].
31 See http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/ topic/ensacu.shtml [accessed in November 2010].
32 For a detailed discussion of China’s FTA strategy, see Gao (2008: 55–6).
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First, in terms of the structure, China’s RTAs tend to have a narrower 
coverage than those used by other major players, such as the USA, EU 
or Japan. Normally, China would start with an agreement on trade in 
goods alone and would expand to services only after commitments on 
goods have been substantially implemented. Take the FTA with Pakistan, 
for example. While the liberalization of trade in goods dates back to the 
signing of the agreement on the Early Harvest Program in April 2005, 
the agreement on trade in services was only signed in February 2009. 
Similarly, in the FTA with ASEAN, the agreement on trade in goods 
was signed in November 2004, while the agreement on services was 
only signed in January 2007. A reverse example is the FTA negotiation 
with Australia, which has languished for years partly due to the fact that 
Australia insists on dealing with services liberalization first, while China 
wishes to proceed with the usual ‘goods and then services’ order. With 
regard to the issues that are not traditionally trade-related, such as envir-
onmental protection, competition policy and labour standards, China 
has been reluctant to include them as part of the FTA package, though 
recently it has shown some willingness to incorporate them. Nonetheless, 
in line with its cautious approach, China has largely preferred to address 
these in stand-alone side agreements or Memorandums of Understanding 
(MoUs), rather than through FTAs.
Second, with regard to substantive rules, China has insisted on the rec-
ognition of its market economy status by potential RTA partners as a pre-
condition for virtually every RTA that it has signed. As mentioned earlier, 
in its accession package, China has agreed to be treated as a non-market 
economy. This makes it easier for other countries to find the existence of 
dumping in anti-dumping investigations against China. Given the struc-
tural problems in the WTO decision-making process, it is difficult for 
China to change its non-market economy status in the multilateral trad-
ing system. The remaining option is for China to negotiate with each of 
its trade partners to recognize China’s market economy status. Because it 
has much more bargaining power at the bilateral/regional level, this strat-
egy seems to be working. As of the end of 2009, seventy-nine economies 
have recognized the market economy status of China.33 As such recogni-
tion increases, there will be mounting pressures on those who still deem 
33 Online interview with Zhou Xiaoyan, Director-General of the Bureau of Fair Trade, 
MOFCOM, 31 December 2009. Available at http://gzly.mofcom.gov.cn/website/face/
www_face_history.jsp?desc=&p_page=2&sche_no=1515 [accessed in November 
2010].
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China as a non-market economy to accept its market economy status as 
an established precedent.
4 What lies ahead?
As we can see from the discussions above, China has gradually emerged 
on the central stage of the multilateral trading system. Looking to the 
future, it is very likely that China will become an increasingly active 
player in global trade governance. At the same time, given its diverse 
interests, China’s degree and style of engagement on different aspects of 
global trade governance will likely vary.
First, in WTO negotiations, if the Doha Round ever concludes and a 
new round is launched, we will probably see a more active China at work. 
This will not only be the result of China’s rising economic clout, but will 
also reflect its growing prowess in international diplomacy. Moreover, 
China itself will be more willing to participate in new multilateral trade 
negotiations as by then most of its discriminatory WTO accession provi-
sions will already have expired. Will China’s more active participation 
pose a challenge to the existing power balance in the WTO? Judging from 
China’s past record in the UN and the WTO, it is unlikely that China will 
propose any sweeping changes to the governing structure of the institu-
tion. Instead, China will most likely focus on refining the technical rules 
that fine-tune the system.
Second, in WTO dispute settlement, we should expect more cases 
involving China as either respondent or complainant. In part, this will 
simply continue established patterns in the WTO: over the history of the 
GATT/WTO, it is rare to find cases where the two largest Members – i.e. 
the USA and the EU – are not involved in some capacity. It is only natural 
that we would find China, the next big trader, pursuing and/or receiving 
the same treatment. On the other hand, as some of the past cases illus-
trate – such as the audiovisual case, the subsidies case and the ongoing 
debate on China’s currency policy34 – many of China’s trade disputes are 
not just the old-fashioned clash between the giants that we have seen in 
disputes between the USA and the EU. Instead, they reflect the inher-
ent tension between the economic and political systems of China and 
the fundamental principles of the WTO, which were designed by and 
34 For the complicated issues raised by the currency dispute, see e.g. Evenett (2010), espe-
cially section 5: Does the crisis-era Renminbi regime violate WTO rules? Is the threat of 
WTO litigation credible?
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for economies that operate in vastly different environments. Will China 
work to change the existing rules in its favour through the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism? This seems unlikely. As illustrated in the previ-
ous discussion, while China has been trying to change some of the rules, 
the focus has been almost exclusively on rules that it finds discriminatory 
against itself, rather than general WTO rules.
Third, in the short- to medium-term future, we will probably see China’s 
RTA frenzy waning down for several reasons. First, the non-market econ-
omy status clause in China’s Accession Protocol will expire in 2016, leav-
ing China with no need to reward countries with RTAs just for the sake of 
recognizing its market economy status. Second, if one looks around, it is 
evident that most countries that are willing to negotiate RTAs with China 
have already done so, making it harder to find new candidates. Third, as 
the recent protests against China in Malaysia and Indonesia35 have shown, 
there might be a backlash against China when the RTA commitments 
kick in. The complicated political consequences of its RTAs, whose full 
implications remain to be seen, will probably make China more cautious 
in pursuing future regional agreements.
As history has shown, no international institutions can survive for long 
without the support of key players. As the biggest emerging power in the 
world today, China deserves a seat at the big-boys’ table. While the other 
major powers, such as the USA, EU and India, might feel uneasy, they 
have to realize that recognizing a larger role for China in global trade gov-
ernance also suits their own interests and those of the multilateral trading 
system as a whole. While the WTO, unlike its sister institutions, does not 
have any formal ‘high table’, it is an open secret that many key decisions 
are made in informal processes, such as the ‘Green Room’, which extends 
invitations only to key players. If China were denied the chance to join in 
the game that the major powers have been playing, it might well decide to 
make its own. Of course, one might have doubts as to whether the ‘golden 
straitjacket’ of multilateral trade rules, initially made for the medium-
sized average WTO Members, could constrain an XXXL-size country like 
China. But such concerns are probably unwarranted as China has largely 
been a system maintainer in the WTO. In short, while China’s ascent in 
global trade governance might raise some feelings of uneasiness, the best 
way to ease such concerns is by greeting it with more mutual understand-
ing and accommodation, rather than reacting with fear and suspicion.
35 See NAM NEWS NETWORK (2010) and Suwarni (2010). 
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7
LDC priorities for improved global  
trade governance
Atul Kaushik and Julian Mukiibi
Least developed countries (LDCs) are faced with a suite of challenges to 
their effective participation in global trade governance. Global trade gov-
ernance includes bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements, 
and intergovernmental institutions like the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). This chapter focuses on the multilateral trading system and 
specifically the WTO. It explores the emerging role of LDCs in WTO 
decision-making processes for negotiating the rules of the multilat-
eral trading system and makes concrete proposals for advancing their 
priorities.
After a brief background on LDCs in WTO decision-making proc-
esses, this chapter reviews the historical role of developing countries in 
decision-making related to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the emergence of developing country coalitions in multilateral 
trade negotiations and the development of the LDC coalition in the WTO. 
It then sets out LDC priorities for improved global trade governance, 
emphasizing the role of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) and the 
need for LDCs to take greater ownership of efforts to integrate them into 
the trading system. It continues by making the case for the creation of an 
institution for LDC-specific needs in Geneva. The chapter concludes with 
a summary of recommendations.
Atul Kaushik is Director (Climate Change), Ministry of Environment and Forests in India 
and was previous head of CUTS Geneva Resource Centre. Julian Mukiibi is a Programme 
Officer at CUTS Geneva Resource Centre and previously served as an Advisor in Legal and 
Economic Affairs at the Ugandan Mission to the WTO. The authors acknowledge with 
gratitude the discussions they had with various LDC negotiators in Geneva, and valuable 
comments by an anonymous expert and Carolyn Deere Birkbeck. All errors and omissions 
are solely of the authors.
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